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Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Navy, and the Civil War
One expects great things from a monograph whose title so consciously asks
its readers to compare it to T. Harry Williams’ classic Lincoln and His Generals
(1952), and Professor Symonds ably delivers. There is no dearth of recent books
that expand our knowledge of the Union Navy and its sailors, but there is none
that so capably explores the relationship between President Abraham Lincoln,
the navy’s civilian and military leadership, and the evolution of Union strategy.
Symonds’s thesis is reminiscent of Williams’s seminal work. He argues that
Lincoln was forced by circumstances to be an active and involved commander in
chief. The scale and scope of the war overwhelmed the navy just as it had the
army, forcing Lincoln to become an active participant in strategic planning. The
impact of naval events extended beyond the battlefield to the diplomatic sphere,
most famously expressed through the Trent affair, which created continuous
tension not only within the service but also between the navy and the State
Department. Navigating this bureaucratic minefield required regular presidential
intervention.
Symonds characterizes Lincoln as a “reluctant" commander-in-chief.
However, he makes it clear that “reluctance" should not be confused with
temerity or indecision. Lincoln’s great contribution to the conduct of the war was
his constant focus on the war’s end result. He was willing, as Symonds
repeatedly demonstrates, to be flexible about how the Union’s war aims were
achieved. Actions that might be interpreted as indecisive or dithering were, in
fact, Lincoln allowing events to unfold to see if a particular situation might
resolve itself without his intervention. Sometimes that happened as naval officers
or cabinet secretaries rose to the challenge. When it did not, Lincoln exerted his
1
Hackemer: Lincoln and His Admirals
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2009
command authority at all levels, interjecting himself into campaign planning,
diplomatic affairs, the conduct of the war on the western rivers, and promotion
decisions for key officers. Symonds argues, as Williams did before him for the
army, that Lincoln became less active as a trustworthy and competent naval
command structure took shape.
Lincoln and His Admirals is solidly researched, well argued, and engagingly
written. What really makes the book stand out, however, is the insight that
Symonds provides into the minds and actions of the key players. Readers will
quickly understand that the author has devoted a lot of time trying to figure out
exactly who these people were, what motivated them, and how their individual
personalities affected the conduct and outcome of the naval war. The almost
continuous tension between Gideon Welles and William Seward is a regular
theme, but one also gains a better understanding of the importance of Gustavus
Vasa Fox, the political machinations of the Blair family, the impetuousness of
Charles Wilkes and William Porter, the periodic indecision that seemed to
plague Samuel Francis Du Pont, Samuel Phillips Lee and Louis Goldsborough,
and the recurring problem of John Dahlgren’s promotion. The book is far richer
as a result, especially when it links these personalities to larger discussions of
Union strategy.
The book provides solid coverage of naval policy throughout, which makes
one omission puzzling. Symonds discusses the navy’s rapid expansion at the
beginning of the war in some detail, linking the policy and practical
ramifications of an effective blockade with a dysfunctional bureaucracy ill-suited
for conducting war on this scale. However, there is no corresponding discussion
of the reduction in ships that began well before the end of hostilities. Given
Symonds’s keen analysis of the interplay between policy and action throughout
Lincoln and His Admirals, it would have been nice to have seen the same applied
here.
In the end, one has to return to the long shadow cast by T. Harry Williams
and ask if Professor Symonds has met the challenge imposed by his own title.
The answer, this reviewer thinks, is a resounding yes. The navy was, without a
doubt, the junior partner in a predominantly terrestrial war. However, it played
an important role in the ultimate defeat of the Confederacy, which requires
historians to better understand how naval policy was formulated and
implemented, both in of itself and in the context of the larger war effort. This
book provides that insight and therefore belongs in the collection of every
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serious historian of the Civil War.
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